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4.1  Introduction 
The consequences  of industrialization and associated urbanization  for the 
health and well-being of the mass of the population have been a topic of study 
and intensive debate in Britain  at least since the days of Toynbee and Marx. 
Two sides quickly crystallized: the “optimists,” who argued that most British 
workers experienced  some modest  increase  in their  standard of  living even 
before 1840, and the “pessimists,” who painted a far grimmer picture of impov- 
erishment and degradation. In terms of traditional measures of the standard of 
living, the consumption  of  goods and  services, the optimists  seem to have 
largely won, although they admit that the pre-1840 gain to the workers was 
very modest and involved an increasingly unequal distribution of income (the 
first leg of the “Kuznets curve”). The attempt by the pessimists to counter, by 
stressing deteriorating living and working conditions (from “sweet Auburn” to 
the  “satanic mills”), was cleverly  repulsed by  Williamson,  who pointed  out 
that the workers accepted increased squalor and risk of disease in return for 
modest wage premiums (Williamson 1981, 1982). It might be noted, however, 
that the most striking consequence of an unhealthy environment-namely,  in- 
creased infant and child mortality-only  affected  the wage eamer-decision 
maker  indirectly. While parents,  and would-be  parents,  no doubt found the 
prospect of high child death rates distressing (and indeed the result was some- 
what higher wage rates in particularly unhealthy areas), still, the principal los- 
ers were the dead children themselves. They, however, had no say in the fami- 
ly’s location decision. 
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More recent work on the health status of the population, in the United States 
as well as in Great Britain, indicates a deterioration during periods of rapid 
industrialization and urbanization around the middle 50 years of the nineteenth 
century (see, e.g., Komlos 1987). This deplorable development is discernible 
not just in mortality  and morbidity, but also, and perhaps most strikingly, in 
height and weight measures. Despite some apparent increase in the standard of 
living as conventionally measured, the population was physically deteriorating. 
Nutrition, net of  the demands of  growth, work, and struggle against disease 
and infection, seems to have been tending downward for a majority of the pop- 
ulation. 
These results raise a number of interesting historical questions. One rather 
obvious question is whether the “welfare” of  the population  was in fact im- 
proving, even if per capita real income and consumption (as traditionally mea- 
sured) were tending upward. Another equally important question is what spe- 
cific aspects of the British and American experience were responsible for the 
observed deterioration in health. Was it a more or less inevitable consequence 
of industrialization or urbanization or was it specific to some particular aspect 
of these processes in those particular countries? Hopefully, this second ques- 
tion can be answered with the help of  studies, interesting in their own right, of 
the health consequences of  industrialization and urbanization  in other coun- 
tries and therefore in other settings and time periods. 
One interesting alternative case is Sweden. By Western European standards 
it experienced a rather late but, by any standard, extremely rapid industrializa- 
tion. Thus the country was in relatively  short order transformed from one of 
the poorest to one of the richest countries in Europe. Today Sweden also has 
one of the healthiest and, not coincidentally, one of the tallest populations of 
any country The fact that Swedish industrialization had distinct rural, or at 
least semirural,  aspects  also makes  it  an interesting contrast to the  United 
States and, particularly, to Great Britain. Finally, the plenitude of (believable) 
economic, social, and demographic data makes Sweden a prime candidate for 
study. 
4.2  Economic and Demographic Trends: 1800-1995 
4.2.1  1800-1870 
The important characteristic required of this initial period is that it predate 
the onset of rapid industrialization and economic growth. The key problem, 
therefore, is the choice of end point. Although some economic historians have 
opted for 1850 or 1860 as the most useful break point between traditional and 
modernizing  Sweden, the consensus clearly leans toward  (circa)  1870. The 
best available national income data indicate that per capita GDP increased by 
approximately 0.25 percent per annum between 1820 and 1850, approximately 
1 percent per annum between 1850  and 1870, and approximately 2 percent per 129  Was Industrialization Hazardous to Your Health? Not in Sweden! 
Table 4.1  Raw Data for the Human Development Indexes 
Index of  Per Capita 
Life  Infant  Per Capita  Income 































39.16  167.0 
44. I8  167.6 
39.02  167.9 
42.46  168.2 
42.09  167.6 
42.99  168.1 
43.91  168.2 
40.67  168.4 
44.81  169.5 
45.26  169.0 
44.99  170.2 
45.43  170.3 
48.05  170.9 
49.61  171.5 
51.11  172.3 
52.80  172.4 
52.89  172.5 
55.52  173.0 
57.65  172.9 
58.28  173.4 
57.33  174.1 
62.61  174.8 
63.07  175.2 
64.95  175.8 
67.02  176.1 
68.89  177.4 
7 1.40  177.9 
72.56  178.6 
73.38  179.1 





























































6.87  294.8 
6.81  292.2 
6.75  289.5 
6.91  296.4 
7.07  303.3 
7.24  310.5 
7.41  317.6 
7.98  342.1 
8.55  366.6 
8.42  36 1  .O 
9.33  399.9 
10.86  465.5 
11.32  485.6 
12.09  518.4 
12.92  554.0 
14.65  628.2 
16.12  69 1.4 
18.46  791.8 
20.91  896.8 
17.87  766.4 
22.55  966.9 
27.77  I,  190.9 
32.47  1,392.4 
35.58  1,525.5 
39.38  1,688.7 
42.85  1,837.3 
49.64  2,128.5 
54.97  2,357.2 
63.59  2.7 2  6.7 
77.23  3,311.7 
Sources: Keyfitz and Fleiger (1968), Krantz and Nilsson (1980), Maddison (1991), and Cipolla 
(1968). See text for discussion of height data. The literacy numbers are based on Cipolla’s conclu- 
sion that Swedish literacy in  1850 was 90 percent and virtually all youths were literate. We con- 
cluded that a reasonable rate of increase of literacy in this period was 0.25 percent per year, which 
implies that literacy  reached  100 percent around 1890. The real per capita GDP figures for the 
period  1820-60  are taken  from Maddison (1991). They  are  then  connected to estimates from 
Krantz and Nilsson until  1970. This procedure was recommended by Krantz, who is the ultimate 
source of both series. Swedish kronor were converted into 1970 U.S. dollars assuming an exchange 
rate of 5.18 Skr per dollar. 
annum in the following  decades (see table 4.1). While these  numbers  lend 
some credibility to using either 1850 or 1870 as the break point, other factors 
point especially to 1870. For example, the fact that Sweden experienced  its 
last non-war-induced  subsistence  crisis  in the late  186Os, together with the 
extremely rapid industrialization spurt of the early 1870s, certainly argues for 130  Lars G. Sandberg and Richard H. Steckel 
making 1870 the year of  choice. More generally, after 1870, numerous eco- 
nomic and demographic indicators started to rise or, when appropriate, to fall 
rapidly compared with previous rates. More important, even if they on occa- 
sion later slowed down, or even reversed slightly, nothing even close to pre- 
1870 levels were ever to be seen again (Sandberg 1978). 
The choice of starting date for the period is less obvious and less important. 
Whether it is 1720, 1750, 1800, or even 1820 matters relatively little. Whatever 
the starting date, the period before 1870 presents a basically agrarian coun- 
try with periods of  relative prosperity interspersed with war- or crop-failure- 
induced periods of  famine and unspeakable suffering. The cycle was  not of 
business but of harvests (Carlsson 1961, 33-49). 
This is not to deny that things were changing. A distinct upward trend can 
be discerned in population, and organizational and technological change was 
beginning to affect the economy, definitely including agriculture. Still, as one 
of us once wrote with only slight exaggeration, “About the best thing that can 
be said for the country’s economic performance between 1720 (or 1800) and 
1850 (or 1870) is that Sweden proper was supporting more than twice as large 
a population in  1850 as in  1720” (Sandberg 1978, 651). Between 1800 and 
1870, the Swedish population increased from 2.3 to 4.2 million. Since a virtu- 
ally unchanged 75-80  percent of the population was dependent on agriculture 
for its living in both years, it is hardly surprising that the share of the popula- 
tion categorized as belonging to the “rural proletariat” was increasing. It had 
grown from about 25 percent of the agricultural population and 20 percent of 
the entire population in  1750 to close to 50 percent and 40 percent, respec- 
tively, during the period between 1850 and 1870. Despite the fact that substan- 
tially more land was being cultivated in 1870 than in 1750 or 1800, it was also 
the case that the average holding of those fortunate enough to be land-owning 
peasants had clearly shrunk (GArdlund  1942, 268; Heckscher 1954, 171-72; 
Samuelsson 1963, 10-13;  Hildebrand 1978,597). 
On a slightly more optimistic note, it does seem likely (as confirmed by the 
per capita GDP figures mentioned above) that output per worker in Swedish 
agriculture was starting to increase, albeit slowly, after circa 1830. In view of 
rapidly rising (real) land prices, however, it seems unlikely that per capita in- 
come among the agricultural proletariat was improving, and it certainly was 
declining during the crisis years of the “hungry forties” and the late 1860s. 
Data on the real wages of day labor tend to support this conclusion. They shows 
no discernible trend before circa 1870, and there are distinct downturns in the 
1845-54  and  1865-69  periods. In view of  the positive relationship between 
rural wages and work opportunities, the wage rate downturns probably fail 
fully to reflect the true level of distress (Sandberg and Steckel 1988, 12-14). 
With regard to other sectors of the economy, there were stimngs in the pre- 
1870 period. Ironworking began to make a noticeable comeback around the 
middle of the nineteenth century, and there was progress in mechanical indus- 
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in Great Britain, led to a major expansion of the timber industry starting around 
1850. It was not before  1870, however, that modernization got up a real head 
of steam. The very modest level of industrialization before 1870, together with 
the rural, or at most semiurban, nature of that industrialization is reflected in 
the data on urban population. Even though it must be kept in mind that Swedish 
cities were defined in legal rather than economic or demographic terms, it is 
still apparent that at least until  1870 urban Sweden was stagnating. Indeed, a 
recent demographic and economic history of Stockholm during this period is 
entitled A Stagnating Metropolis (Soderberg, Jonsson, and Persson 199  1). The 
share of the total population classified as urban had increased only from around 
10 percent in  1800 to around 13 percent in  1870. Even more striking, Stock- 
holm’s share of the entire population declined between 1800 and 1850 and had 
barely recovered to its 1800 level by 1870 (Montgomery 1939, 108; Statistiska 
CentralbyrHn 1969, table 6). 
4.2.2  1870-1914 
By any standard, this period witnessed extremely rapid industrialization and 
economic growth. Scholarly debate deals with questions of how fast it was- 
for example, did Sweden grow faster than any other country in Europe? About 
the basic trend, there is no disagreement. The same can be said about the late 
1890s, which was the  most remarkable subperiod within  this  longer period 
(Sandberg 1978). It might also be noted that the reason for ending in 1914 is 
strictly related  to World War  I  (Sweden was neutral) and has no particular 
economic significance. 
During these decades, Sweden’s population increased from approximately 
4.2 to approximately 5.7 million  inhabitants (Statistiska CentralbyrHn 1969, 
46-47).  This reflects a rate of growth somewhat below that experienced during 
the previous period. It was the net result of falling birth and death rates com- 
bined with a very high rate of emigration, overwhelmingly to the United States 
(see Hofsten and Lundstrom 1976). Close to a million Swedes departed their 
homeland, and since virtually  all of  them were young adults, the long-term 
effect on the Swedish population was even greater than that number implies 
(Carlsson 1961, 454-62;  Hildebrand 1978, 599). Absent this emigration, the 
rate of population growth clearly would have been outpacing that of the previ- 
ous period. While the great mass of  the emigrants no doubt improved their 
economic condition, whether those staying behind gained or lost is less clear 
and depends, among other things, on the rate of remittances from the emi- 
grants. As for the age structure of  the population, the net effect was a very 
modest change in the size of the working-age (15-64)  population from 60.5 
percent in 1870 to 59.9 percent in 1910 (Statistiska CentralbyrHn 1969, 68). 
Our economic data, which are admittedly imperfect, indicate that Swedish 
national income grew at an average annual rate of approximately 2.8 percent 
between 1870 and 1910. In per capita terms, this amounts to an equally impres- 
sive rate of 2.0 percent (Krantz and Nilsson  1980, table 3.1; Maddison  1991, 132  Lars G. Sandberg and Richard H. Steckel 
table B 1). Not surprisingly, statistical measures of rising living standards show 
similar growth. Real hourly wages and annual incomes more than  doubled 
(Hildebrand 1978, 609). This growth, of course, was also reflected in a rapid 
change in the sectoral distribution of the population. The share of the popula- 
tion dependent on agriculture dropped from approximately three-quarters to 
less than one-half, while the share dependent on manufacturing rose from less 
than one-sixth to approximately one-third (Cole and Deane 1968, 27; Jorberg 
From an international perspective, a striking aspect of  Swedish industrial- 
ization, especially during this period, was its predominately nonurban location. 
The percentage of all industrial workers employed in noncity locations reached 
its peak only around the turn of  the century. At that time,  something in the 
vicinity of 65 percent of all industrial workers were employed outside the cities 
(Ghdlund 1942,296). While it is true that these distinctions are based on legal 
rather than strictly economic definitions of cities and that the “rural” industrial 
“agglomerations” were not salubrious garden spots, still, there is, and espe- 
cially was, a big difference between them and large industrial cities (Swedish 
or not). Naturally, this rural-dominated location of industry is also reflected in 
the general urbanization  statistics. Between  1870 and  1913, the percentage 
of the population  living in cities had roughly doubled from 13 to 26 percent 
(Statistiska CentralbyrHn 1969,46). Of course, the figures, especially the latter, 
would be somewhat higher  if  the  “rural industrial agglomerations”  are in- 
cluded. While this rate of growth was far from trivial, it still does not compare 
with  urbanization  in  the major  industrial  countries.  Furthermore,  Swedish 
cities were overwhelmingly small. In 1910, the population  of Stockholm was 
still less than 350,000, and of the others, only Gothenburg exceeded 100,000 
(Milward and Saul 1973,497-98;  Heckscher 1954, 145). The fact of the matter 
is that almost all Swedish “cities,” in 1914 containing a clear majority of all 
city dwellers, would by contemporary American or British standards best be 
described as “towns” or, in some cases, as “small towns.” 
1994,452-53). 
4.2.3  1914-1950 
The road  Sweden traveled to get from 1914 to midcentury was, in many 
respects, a rocky one. At the same, however, it clearly was less painful than that 
of most, or even all, other industrialized countries. Sweden’s big advantage, of 
course, was the ability to remain neutral in both world wars. 
Though war is never a good thing, World War I only became a source of 
suffering in Sweden with the introduction of unlimited submarine warfare and 
tight blockades in 1917. The food shortage of the winter of 1917-18  was suffi- 
ciently serious, however, to set off food riots and to earn Prime Minister Ham- 
marskjold the less than complimentary  nickname “Hungerskjold.” Thus, al- 
though Sweden did not endure anything like the hardships of the combatants, 
the peace was certainly welcome. Unfortunately, there, as elsewhere, it was 
accompanied by the arrival of the Spanish flu pandemic. 
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deflation crisis. Once the prewar position of the krona had been reestablished 
in 1922, however, the 1920s evolved into a period of growth and prosperity. As 
in the rest of the industrial world, the good times ran out with the onset of the 
Great  Depression.  Despite  the  distinctly  Swedish  nature  of  the  so-called 
Krueger  crash of  1932, Sweden weathered  the  1930s a lot better than most 
other countries. The principal reasons for this relatively favorable experience 
were (1) a prompt devaluation of the krona, (2) the generally favorable devel- 
opment of  Swedish export markets, (3) a more expansionary-or  at least less 
contractionary-economic  policy than that pursued  in most other industrial 
countries, and (4) good luck. While international political developments were 
obviously worrisome, not to say downright scary, Swedes had little reason to 
complain about economic conditions during the late 1930s. 
World War I1 was certainly unpleasant in Sweden. Fuel in particular was in 
short supply-lots  of shivering, not many baths, and virtually no driving. Food 
was rationed, but unlike the latter part of  World War  I, nothing resembling 
starvation or malnutrition  threatened. For most people, the biggest  irritation 
was probably  the lack of  coffee and tobacco. None of  this, of  course, even 
deserves to be mentioned in the same breath as the unspeakable suffering that 
occurred in many other countries. 
At the end of the war, Sweden’s Keynesian economic establishment shared 
the general fear of renewed worldwide depression. In fact, of course, a lack of 
effective demand was the least of  Europe’s, or the world’s, problems. Physi- 
cally unscathed by  the war, Sweden was in almost as good a position as the 
United States (although obviously on a much smaller scale) to take advantage 
of the postwar reconstruction boom. Thus, good, if inflationary, times started 
almost immediately with the war’s end, and they were far from over in  1950. 
Over the entire period  1914-50  the Swedish population  grew, but only mod- 
estly. The total population  increased from approximately 5.7 million in 1914 
to approximately 7.0 million in 1950. This slowing rate of growth was the joint 
result of rapidly falling birth and death rates (Hofsten and Lundstrom  1976, 
12-17).  As for migration, after a modest final burst in the 1920s, Swedish emi- 
gration fell to very low levels. Instead, a rising level of immigration, much of 
it consisting of political refugees, took over. Migration was now a net contribu- 
tor  to population  growth. It  also had  the  effect  of  slowing the percentage 
shrinkage  of  the  economically  active  age groups  (Statistiska  Centralbyrdn 
1969, 124, 130-31).  Despite the fluctuations  of the period, the general eco- 
nomic trend was clearly upward. Real per capita domestic product increased 
by  an average of 2.5 percent per year (Krantz and Nilsson  1980, table 3.1; 
Maddison 1991, table Bl). Similar gains were recorded in per capita income 
and other measures of  living standards. Between  1913 and  1939, real hourly 
wages in industry increased by 88 percent, with annual real earnings increasing 
by  52 percent. The difference was due to a sharp decrease in the workweek. 
Between 1939 and 1949, these percentage increases were 25.5 and 27 percent, 
respectively (Heckscher 1954, 280-81). 
The continuing rapid industrialization of Sweden can be seen in the figures 134  Lars G. Sandberg and Richard H. Steckel 
for the sectoral distribution of the labor force. By 1950, the share of the popula- 
tion dependent on agriculture had declined to 25 percent. Meanwhile, the share 
of manufacturing had increased to 43 percent while that of the service sector 
had risen to an impressive 22 percent. As for the urban-rural division, the cities 
maintained a fairly steady rate of relative growth. By 1937, the population of 
the cities had reached the 36 percent level, and by  1950 their share stood at 
48 percent (Statistiska Centralbyrib 1969, 46). Once again, these percentages 
would have been larger if the “industrial agglomerations” were included. In 
addition, on a world scale, Stockholm was now beginning to approach the size 
of at least a midsized metropolitan area. Still, the lack of  crowding and the 
availability of space, both within the cities, and certainly in rural areas, contin- 
ued to be a principal characteristic of Sweden. 
4.2.4  1950-1995 
The period since 1950 can best be divided into two periods, the split oc- 
curring around 1975. The first half, especially the 1960s, was a period of truly 
spectacular economic growth and prosperity. During the whole quarter of a 
century between  1950 and  1975 real per capita GDP increased at an annual 
rate of approximately 2.5 percent.  During the period  1960-75,  it did so by 
over 3 percent per annum. Starting around the middle of the 1970s, however, 
developments in Sweden, as in most of Western Europe, became much more 
mixed. Between  1975 and 1989, real GDP per capita increased at an annual 
rate of approximately 1.5 percent. Since then growth has been even slower and 
more uncertain. 
These years, of course, also witnessed the emergence of a so-called service 
economy. At least in the Swedish case it was, and continues to be, dominated 
by government services. The share of government expenditures in GNP, as well 
as the share of taxes in income, reached levels (well above 50 percent) unprece- 
dented in Sweden or elsewhere. Indeed, although apologists for the exploding 
public  sector like, or at least liked, to blame the “oil shocks” for Sweden’s 
recent economic, and especially its productivity, retardation, most informed 
observers tend principally to blame the bloated government services sector to- 
gether with the incentive-destroying features of the income redistribution poli- 
cies being followed. 
Sweden’s population continued to grow at a modest rate during this period. 
Increasingly, however, such growth came to depend on continued large-scale 
immigration. This dependence is seen to be even greater when it is noticed that 
the immigrant groups have much higher birthrates than do native-born Swedes. 
Sweden’s urbanization also has continued apace, despite government poli- 
cies favoring rural areas and small towns. In particular, there has been a striking 
concentration of population  in the three major urban areas centered around 
Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmo. Even these metropolitan areas, however, 
are characterized by an availability of space not typical of the European conti- 
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spectacular comeback. Wolves and bears are reappearing in areas where they 
have not been seen since the late eighteenth century. Indeed one of  the cur- 
rently popular political justifications for agricultural subsidies is that they help 
prevent Sweden from losing its open landscape and becoming a single great 
big forest. 
4.3  Mortality, Health, and Heights 
4.3.1  1800-1870 
One of the most striking features of this period overall is the clear downward 
trend in mortality and the associated increase in life expectancy (see table 4.1 
and figs. 4.1-4.6). This development is made even more intriguing by the ab- 
sence of any pronounced trend in per capita incomes at least until  1850. In- 
deed, even if there was some modest increase in average incomes, that trend, 
as far as health and mortality is concerned (once again, at the very least until 
1850),  tended to be offset by the increasingly unequal distribution of income 
and wealth. It thus seems clear that the improvement in health and life expec- 
tancy  was not principally, or at all, the result of higher incomes and living 
standards (as normally defined). It is, of course, possible that the opposite ef- 
fect, from health  to income, was at work. That, however, would imply that 
without the improvement in health, incomes would have been falling. 
It is also interesting to look at the trend in heights. Our principal source of 
height data for this paper comes from measurements of conscripted militia.’ 
These records cover cohorts of virtually the entire male population, but unfor- 
tunately they only go back to cohorts born in 18  19. For earlier periods we have 
to rely on measurements of  the settled (indelta) army. The trend in military 
heights was clearly upward for cohorts born in the 1790s until the 1840s.  After 
that point,  average adult heights  declined either a lot (based on the  settled 
army) or a little (based on the militia). Growth then resumed, especially for 
those young men who reached puberty after the subsistence crisis of the late 
1860s (Sandberg and Steckel 1988). 
We suppose it is possible to argue that the fact that adult heights for cohorts 
born around 1840, and reaching maturity in the  186Os, were similar to those 
born  in the  1800-1810  period  indicates the absence of  any overall trend  in 
heights during the whole 1800-1870 period. From such a conclusion, it would 
then follow that there was little or no connection between trends in mortality 
1. Three qualifications about this data source are fully described in the data appendix. First, the 
age at measurement, originally 21 years, gradually decreased until it reached 18 years after World 
War 11. Since the age was reduced in line with the decline in age at maturation, however, these 
changes have very little effect on the trend in  final adult heights. Second, data are missing for a 
few scattered years, which required us to interpolate. Third, the military imposed nontrivial mini- 
mum height standards on cohorts born  between  1819 and  1839. We  adjusted for the resulting 
shortfall using the Quantile Bend Estimator. Fig. 4.1  Age-specific mortality rates for men aged 1-14,1751-1970 
(deaths per 1,000) 
Source: Hofsten and Lundstrorn (1976). Fig. 4.2  Age-specific mortality rates for women aged 1-14,1751-1970 
(deaths per 1,000) 
Source: Hofsten and Lundstrorn (1976). Fig. 4.3  Age-specific mortality rates for men aged 15-34,175i-1970 
(deaths per 1,000) 
Source: Hofsten and Lundstrorn (1976). 60 
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Fig. 4.4  Age-specific mortality rates for women aged 15-34,1751-1970 
(deaths per 1,000) 
Source: Hofsten and  Lundstrom (1976). Fig. 4.5 
(deaths per 1,000) 
Source: Hofsten and Lundstrom (1976). 
Age-specific mortality rates for men aged 35-79,1751-1970 I  I  1  I  I 
1800  18M)  1900  1950  2000  YEAR 
Fig. 4.6  Age-specific mortality rates for women aged 35-79,  1751-1970 
(deaths per 1,000) 
Source: Hofsten and Lundstrom (1976). 142  Lars G. Sandberg and Richard H. Steckel 
and trends in average adult heights. That would be a rather  startling result. 
From an even longer perspective, however, it seems clear that the decline in 
heights for cohorts of the 1840s was quickly reversed and constituted no more 
than a temporary dip in an upward trend. The levels reached by the cohorts of 
the  1830s were  soon reestablished  and  surpassed  after  1870. Furthermore, 
while there was no large increase in mortality rates for adults during the late 
1840s and  early  1850s, there  was a sharp increase for children, especially 
young children. Since average adult heights are not materially affected by the 
income and nutrition levels of adults, it seems clear that the drop in recorded 
heights was the result of  the particularly, and indeed atypically, harsh condi- 
tions endured by  young  children during those years  (Sandberg and Steckel 
1988). An  additional explanation of this rising  child mortality  would stress 
factors that spread disease, such as the substantial increase in internal migra- 
tion as well as growing school attendance around the middle of the century.* 
Accepting that argument leads to the conclusion that the trend in heights 
during the 1800-1 870 period was clearly upward. Thus, the larger conclusion 
is that during those decades life expectancy and average adult heights tended 
upward, while income or the standard of living fluctuated without trend at least 
until  1850. After  1850, the increase in per capita GDP may or may not have 
been offset by an increasingly unequal distribution of income. Obviously then, 
the apparent trend toward improving health, while perhaps contributing to in- 
come growth, cannot have been a product of  such growth until,  at the very 
earliest, 1850. One possible boost to improving health probably came from the 
general lack of  urbanization. As noted  above, there was very little growth in 
urbanization during this period, and Stockholm especially stagnated. In view 
of the unhealthy condition of Swedish cities, and especially of Stockholm, this 
lack of urbanization certainly must have been beneficial to health. 
The absence of both income growth (a supposed plus for health) and urban- 
ization (a supposed  minus  for health) prior to at least  1850, however, can 
hardly  constitute  an  explanation  for improved  health.  Clearly,  some  other 
forces must have been at work. The standard explanations offered by historians 
are the potato, peace, and smallpox vaccinations (e.g., Carlsson 1961, 37). 
This was the period during which the extremely high yielding potato became 
a field crop in Sweden. This in turn  led to a considerable increase both  in 
direct human consumption and to the replacement of grain in distilling. Since 
potatoes are more nutritious than bread and bread is more nutritious than alco- 
hol, it is not surprising that this development tended to raise both life expec- 
tancy and average heights. The low price of potatoes, however, meant that in- 
creases in its consumption had little impact on measured incomes. It seems 
apparent that the population preferred to eat bread, but low incomes, or the 
2. The Elementary Education Act of  1842 promoted schooling of  young children, and the Poor 
Law Act of  1847 eliminated restrictions on personal movement. For a discussion of these points, 
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attraction of low potato prices, induced them to eat potatoes instead. The re- 
sulting improvement  in nutrition, and consequently in health, thus becomes 
ultimately a matter of serendipity. Consumers simply may not have anticipated 
the health  benefits  of  the potato.  If, on the other hand, those benefits  were 
recognized, thus making potato consumption  more attractive,  then what  we 
have is a case of massive, unrecognized (and unrecorded) consumer surplus. 
Peace, or the absence of war, was certainly a blessing. The disastrous conse- 
quences of war on health and mortality in Sweden can easily be seen from data 
on the eighteenth and very early nineteenth centuries. On the other hand, it is 
clear that nineteenth-century  health was considerably better even than that of 
the peaceful years of  the eighteenth century, once again without there being 
any great difference in measured incomes. 
We  are  choosing to expand  “vaccination” beyond  its, certainly  very  im- 
portant, literal meaning to include public and, to a lesser extent, private health 
measures. In addition to vaccinations (especially  against  smallpox) per se, 
there were marked improvements in sanitation, hygiene, and child care. Much 
of this was accomplished through government propaganda in favor of breast- 
feeding  and  general  improvements  in  sanitation  (Lithell  1981,  183). The 
church and, even more so, the system of compulsory schools were effectively 
used to spread official views on these subjects. The fact that Sweden was a 
highly literate country with a long tradition of bureaucratic and church control 
over the individual’s private life meant that these campaigns were a good deal 
more successful than would have been the case in countries, such as England 
or the United States, where much more emphasis was put on individual free- 
dom and autonomy. 
More concrete measures were also undertaken. The system of training mid- 
wives, first controlled by the government as early as 1711, was improved and 
expanded following the issuance of new regulations in 18  19 and again in 1840 
(Lundquist 1963,645-48).  During the same period, the system of state district 
physicians  that  dated  back  to  1773 was  similarly  expanded  and  improved 
markedly  (Bergstrand  1963, 127, 156-57).  Even more important, the  1857 
statute on epidemics, which put great emphasis on improved sanitation, was 
quickly followed by improvements in water and sewage systems. The major 
improvements in Stockholm’s access to clean water and efficient sewers during 
the  1860s had immediately  observable effects on the city’s death rate from 
typhus (Bergman 1963,379-80). 
Some interesting facts concerning the human capital aspects of low Swed- 
ish, and other Scandinavian, infant and child mortality rates can be gleaned 
from data on various ethnic groups in the United States in  1900. The infant 
mortality rate for children of Swedish-born women in America was very low, 
both  relative  to other groups of  immigrants and relative  to the children  of 
native-born white American women, but it was somewhat higher than contem- 
poraneous Swedish levels. It is also noteworthy that the superior mortality per- 
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greatest for young children (Sandberg 1979, 234). A final alternative, or sup- 
plementary, explanation for the improving health trend is an improving epide- 
miological environment. That is certainly possible, although at least one major 
new disease, cholera, appeared in Sweden during this period. Once again, how- 
ever, although it was a terrible killer in the major cities, especially Stockholm, 
the basically rural nature of  the country strictly limited the effect even of this 
new killer disease. 
Although no long-run connection can be established between rising income 
and improving health during this period, there seems to be a clear connection 
between downturns in income, almost invariably the result of poor harvests, 
and downturns, or at least stagnation, in health. This connection can be seen 
especially in the late 1840s and early 1850s. Similar, although perhaps not so 
powerful, effects can be seen resulting from income declines in roughly  the 
late 181Os, the early 1830s, and the late  1860s. The apparent connection be- 
tween income and health during these periods at least raises the possibility that 
the effects of rising income and nonincome trend effects on improving health 
can be separated. Such a separation would also be very useful in interpreting 
the experience  of later periods  when  income  and  health  were  trending up- 
ward together. 
4.3.2  1870-1914 
The time after  1870 is in some sense less interesting than the preceding 
period. This is so because,  starting around  1870, all Swedish indicators of 
health and income have rapidly  trended  upward together. Nonetheless, there 
are some differences in rate and composition that throw light on the interrela- 
tionship among the variables being studied. If the increase in child mortality 
that occurred around the middle of the century is impressive, the even greater 
drop that followed after circa  1870 is truly  startling. Ultimately, all that can 
be  said is that child mortality  in Sweden nosedived  after the onset of rapid 
industrialization  and income  growth. Clearly,  the  conditions, presumably  a 
shortage of  food, that had  caused the crisis in child health  were  totally  re- 
versed. 
Not only was the crop failure of 1868-69  never repeated but increasing do- 
mestic production was augmented by  a rising flood of basic foodstuffs from 
America. To the distress of Swedish commercial agriculture, but to the benefit 
of consumers, the result was a clear fall in the relative price of food (see Carls- 
son 1961,558).  Thus even the rapid growth of real incomes fails fully to reflect 
the increased access to food. The commencement of major public health proj- 
ects, especially the construction of water and sewer facilities, in urban areas 
also was a major plus for life expectancy. 
For other age groups, there were also benefits, but they were less spectacular 
than those for the children. Interestingly enough, by far the smallest gains were 
achieved by young adults. Since these groups, generally speaking, were the 
survivors of  the young child cohorts that had experienced such high rates of 
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hungry forties and fifties were still claiming victims a decade or two later. Put 
somewhat differently, it implies that any selectivity effect from the earlier high 
child death rates was more than offset by the damage to the long-run health of 
the survivors. 
Height  data  are  consistent  with  such  an  observation.  The  cohorts  that 
reached maturity before circa 1870 were clearly shorter than those who ma- 
tured later. It should not be surprising if these height-impaired cohorts showed 
evidence of poor health and high mortality throughout their lives. 
It is also interesting to note that the special position of Stockholm, shorter 
than the national  average, and of  the north, taller than the national  average, 
began to erode during this period. The health  disadvantage of urban  living, 
especially big city living, was beginning to disappear. By the same token, the 
advantage of low-density, relatively high protein (mostly from game) living in 
the north also was coming to an end. Today Stockholm is no different from the 
rest of the country, and the north, possibly due to ethnic genetic differences, is 
on the short side. 
These trends in health and heights, of course, are perfectly compatible with 
the rapid growth of income. On the other hand, greater urbanization does not 
seem to have been a major health problem. As already noted, Swedish urban 
areas generally had never been as bad as in many other countries. More im- 
portant, the pre- 1870 public health measures described above were accelerat- 
ing during this period.  Stockholm, in particular,  was rapidly  losing its pre- 
viously well-deserved reputation as a pesthole. 
4.3.3  1914-1950 
Rising  incomes allowed greater access to food, decent housing,  and ever 
improving medical care. The government helped things along with greater ex- 
penditures on water and sanitation facilities, as well as an expansion and im- 
provement of  the system of  publicly  provided  district medical facilities and 
personnel. Once again, during this period health, heights, and incomes steadily 
advanced together. The only noticeable exception to this experience occurred 
in  the  period  right  around the  end  of  World War  I. The food shortage of 
1917-18  was closely followed by  the  Spanish flu pandemic. The net effect 
was serious enough to lower, albeit very briefly, life expectancies at birth. The 
reversal in mortality  rates, however, was heavily concentrated among young 
adults. These groups were then the first to benefit spectacularly once the pan- 
demic had passed. In this case, there might have been some selectivity effect- 
the survivors were on average healthier than the whole cohort, and the Spanish 
flu had left no serious permanent ill effects on those who recovered from it. 
Over the entire period, it is clear that all age groups, with the possible excep- 
tion of the elderly, benefited from a spectacular decrease in all mortality rates. 
For  the  elderly,  the  improvement  was  merely  impressive. For  some  older 
groups, there was also a slight, but certainly perceptible, upturn in mortality 
during the 1930s. 
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larly, the special position of the large cities, on the short side, and the north, on 
the tall side, vanished entirely before the period was over. Another interesting 
development was the shrinkage of the height difference between social classes 
(by now it has disappeared entirely). This was probably a combined effect of 
a more equal distribution of income and the sharp general increase in income 
and, therefore, in nutrition.  Virtually  all children  were  at least,  and at last, 
well fed. 
4.3.4  1950-1995 
This most recent period continues to show improvements  in the health of 
the Swedish population. An  ever rising  standard of living has included im- 
provements in diet, housing, and medical care. The government has chipped in 
with increased expenditures on public health measures, while the advance of 
medical science, especially in the form of new vaccines and antibiotics, has 
played a major role. Average life expectancy at birth has continued to increase 
as have average adult heights. It seems clear, however, that, particularly for the 
most recent decades, the increase in heights has slowed to at most a crawl. 
Apparently, genetic limits are being approached. The fact that social class dif- 
ferences in heights no longer seem to be detectable tends to confirm the belief 
that better nutritional status can yield little in the way of greater stature. By the 
same token, the great reduction in infectious diseases that has already occurred 
leaves little room for improvement in that regard. 
There may be greater room for increases in average life expectancy. Once 
again, however, better access to food is not likely to be the key. Rather a combi- 
nation  of  increasingly  sophisticated medical knowledge  and procedures  to- 
gether with some helpful  “lifestyle” changes are the most  likely remaining 
possible sources of greater life expectancies. 
4.4  Trends in Human Welfare 
As was noted in the introduction, the interrelationship in various countries 
among industrialization, urbanization, income growth, and health is a complex 
and contentious matter. While the Swedish experience might be said to be sim- 
ilar to that of  the United States and Great Britain  in that signs of  declining 
health, that is, a reduction in heights and an increase in mortality  rates, oc- 
curred around the middle of the nineteenth century, the comparison is mis- 
leading. The Swedish problems were the result of population growth and poor 
harvests, not of industrialization and urbanization. While it is certainly possible 
that industrial work and city living per se might have had bad effects on health 
even in Sweden, rapid industrialization and urbanization were in fact accompa- 
nied by clear net improvements in health. Whatever negative effects there may 
have been were clearly more than offset by favorable developments, no doubt 
including, but not limited to, income growth. 
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welfare and, therefore, of any reasonable definition of the standard of living. A 
serious question thus arises as to whether our standard measures of per capita 
income,  particularly those  for earlier  periods,  take  adequate account  of  the 
level, and changes in the level, of health. To the extent that part of measured 
incomes are spent for the express purpose  of attaining improved health and 
increased life expectancy,  there is probably no great measurement  problem. 
Thus, the vast  amounts  currently  expended on health  care in  all industrial 
countries can be considered purchases of improved health and extended life. 
To  the extent that we eat to live longer, part of  the health benefits of a better 
diet might be said to be reflected in our level of measured income and expendi- 
tures. By the same token, expenditures on medical research create improve- 
ments in the production of better health and longer life pretty much the same 
way  as other research produces more enjoyable consumer products. All such 
improvements raise questions of adequate accounting for consumer surplus. 
It is difficult to believe, however, that past improvements in health are ade- 
quately accounted for in income statistics. Changes in health have often oc- 
curred in the form of externalities that have no noticeable effect on income 
figures. For example, the Swedish experience in  1800-1850  of  a noticeable 
upward trend in health during a period of stagnating incomes can hardly have 
been included in those income figures. Such an inclusion would imply that the 
Swedish population was shifting substantial amounts of its income away from 
other goods and services and toward health-producing goods and services. This 
simply did not happen. The role of the potato was serendipitous, and the expen- 
ditures on public health (e.g., smallpox vaccines and improved sanitation and 
hygiene) were tiny compared to the resulting health benefits. In short, major 
improvements in welfare in the form of better health were occurring that were 
barely, if at all, recorded in the income data. 
Even for the later period, it seems clear that health and life expectancy were 
largely being improved by factors that were not adequately accounted for in 
income data. Thus, a case can be made for trying  explicitly to account for 
changes in  health  status  when  constructing  historical  income (or  welfare) 
series. 
One approach recently  developed by the United Nations  for dealing with 
this  problem  has been  to calculate  a so-called  Human  Development  Index 
(HDI; United Nations Development Programme 1990).’  The HDI is calculated 
by subtracting the average of three “deprivation” indexes from 1  .OO. The depri- 
vations used are lack of life expectancy, lack of literacy, and lack of income. 
These indexes are based on a country’s position on a scale between minimum 
and maximum values for life expectancy, literacy, and income, respectively. In 
order to incorporate  a wide range  of  historical  human experience,  we have 
chosen scales between 30 and 80 years for life expectancy, from zero to 100 
3. For a summary of  critiques of  this approach, see United Nations Development  Programme 
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Table 4.2  Deprivation Indexes 
Year 
Life 
Expectancy  Stature 
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Source: Calculated from table 4.1 
percent for literacy, and from the cost of a subsistence diet ($140 in 1970 U.S. 
prices) to the upper bound on the per capita income component recommended 
by the United Nations ($4,861 in  1987 US. dollars, or $1,660 in 1970 U.S. 
dollars; see the discussion of the HDI in the introduction of this volume). The 
index is linear for life expectancy and for literacy (implying constant marginal 
utility)  and logarithmic  for income (implying  declining marginal  utility of 
income). 
We have calculated this index and its components for Sweden at five-year 
intervals between 1820 and 1965 (see tables 4.2 and 4.3 and figs. 4.7-4.9).  In 
order to determine the sensitivity of the index to alternative measures of health, 
we have made the same calculation substituting adult male heights (by birth 149  Was Industrialization Hazardous to Your Health? Not in Sweden! 
Table 4.3  Human Development Indexes 
Life  Infant 

























































































































Source: Calculated from table 4.2 
cohort) and infant mortality respectively for life e~pectancy.~  We are also plan- 
ning to utilize alternative measures of education for literacy. The problem with 
using  literacy in the Swedish case is that it had reached  a level around 90 
percent by  1850 and was close to 100 percent before the turn of the twentieth 
century. Thus, despite the clear benefits accruing through increasing levels of 
schooling, education ends up playing very little role in the growth of the HDI 
for Sweden. The results of our calculations are presented in table 4.3 and figure 
4.  Our range for stature was defined at the low end by  possibly the smallest population ever 
measured-the  Bundi of New Guinea (156 cm)-and  at the upper end by  180 cm, which approxi- 
mately corresponds to the tallest population today (Eveleth and Tanner 1976, 1990).  Our range for 
infant mortality extends from zero percent to 35 percent, which is approximately the highest found 
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Fig. 4.7  Deprivation indexes of health 
Source: Table 4.2. 
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Fig. 4.8  Deprivation indexes of income and literacy 
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Fig. 4.9  Human development indexes 
Source: Table 4.3. 
4.9. A number of  interesting aspects of these indexes are apparent even from 
casual observation.  First of  all, all three alternative  HDIs show very similar 
growth patterns. Indeed, the HDIs based on infant mortality and human stature 
are virtually  identical. This result tends to confirm our view that final adult 
height in Sweden was very heavily influenced by conditions during the first 
year of  life. Furthermore, while the level, although not the growth pattern, of 
the life-expectancy-based HDI differs from its siblings, that difference reflects 
substantially the choice of the life expectancy minimum. If 25 years, rather 
than 30 years, were used as the minimum, all three series would be nearly iden- 
tical. 
Another striking feature of these HDIs, particularly  compared to those for 
some other industrialized countries, is their persistent upward trend. There are 
virtually  no reversals. Even if  annual  data had created a few more such in- 
stances, at least in the preindustrial period, the result is still remarkable. The 
only post-1870 reversal is recorded for 1915 (i.e., 1913-17)  and, of course, is 
the result of the serious economic problems caused by World War I. The food 
supply problems and the Spanish flu epidemic included in the 1920 (1918-22) 
index numbers are not enough to prevent a modest increase between 1915 and 
1920. The fact that the indexes continued to grow during the 1930s (at least on 
a five-year average basis) confirms the view that the Great Depression was both 
relatively  mild and  short lived in Sweden. Yet  another interesting aspect of 
these indexes is their growth rate by periods. Clearly, they all accelerate after 152  Lars G.  Sandberg and Richard H. Steckel 
roughly  1870-that  is, with the onset of rapid industrialization. While there 
was improvement before industrialization, it has been much more rapid since. 
This  more  rapid  growth has  occurred  despite the  fact that  literacy, having 
reached 100 percent by  1890 (at least according to our measure), stopped con- 
tributing to the HDIs at that point. As to the relative contributions of income 
growth and health  improvement, it is clear that health improvement was the 
dominant factor up to circa 1850. Income growth then began to play a greater 
role, especially after 1870. This situation was then reversed during the twenti- 
eth century, largely because of the assumption that the marginal utility of in- 
come is declining. 
It is also interesting to compare the HDIs we have computed for Sweden 
with the results reached for other countries. One such comparison can be made 
with the HDI (stature based) that Costa and Steckel have computed for the 
United States. In 1820 the American HDI (including slaves) was 0.580 while 
the comparable result for Sweden was 0.528. Since Swedes then were clearly 
more literate than Americans, the difference is the result of American advan- 
tages in income and especially health (height). By the time of the great Swed- 
ish migration to the United States (circa 1870), the indexes stood at 0.702 for 
America (including African Americans) and 0.655 for Sweden. Since Swedes 
were still considerably more literate and almost as healthy (tall), the American 
advantage was unquestionably  in  income. Thus, emigration, particularly  of 
landless (literate and healthy) Swedish farm youths made good sense. By 1960, 
however, improvements in Swedish health (height) had reached the point that 
the Swedish HDI nosed out that for the United States despite higher U.S. in- 
comes. 
Finally, a comparison can be made between the Swedish HDI and those of 
various less developed countries today. Overall, the Swedish HDI (this time 
based on life expectancy) just before the onset of rapid industrialization around 
1870 was at a level similar to that of countries currently classified as being at 
the lower level of  “medium human development”  (e.g., Egypt). The compo- 
nents of the index, however, were drastically different. In the case of Egypt in 
1987, per capita incomes are roughly similar (Sweden, $1,224; Egypt, $1,357) 
but life expectancy and literacy differ greatly. In  1870, Swedish life expec- 
tancy at birth was 44.99 years, compared to 62 years for Egypt in 1987. Clearly, 
Egyptian life expectancy has benefited  greatly from developments in public 
health  that have occurred during the past  120 years. On the other hand, the 
Swedish literacy rate in 1870 was in the vicinity of 95 percent compared to 45 
percent for Egypt in 1985. For the individual, a long life expectancy may well 
be more important than being literate, but it seems likely that Sweden’s pros- 
pects for rapid future economic growth in  1870 were a good deal better than 
Egypt’s prospects today. 
As an alternative to the HDI calculations, we have also applied Daniel Ush- 
er’s well-known work assigning dollar values to increases in survival probabili- 
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rather strong, assumptions: (1) utility (U) is a function of consumption (C)  in 
each time period (t);  (2) utility is separable in C,;  (3) all utility functions are of 
the form U, = x:ACp/(l  + rjl, where p is the elasticity of utility with respect 
to C  and r is the individual’s subjective rate of discount; and (4) consumption 
is constant across age groups. On this basis, he is able to calculate the change 
in consumption that a person would be willing to forgo in return for a given 
increase in survival rates as a function of  C, p, and r. The presence of a dis- 
count factor means  that  the  further into the  future  a person’s reduced  age- 
specific mortality decrease lies, the less it will be worth. Thus, reductions in 
infant  and  child mortality  rates  will  have an especially  great effect  on the 
Usher-adjusted well-being of the population. 
Table 4.4 presents actual Swedish five-year interval GDP growth in addition 
to Usher-adjusted (actual GDP plus or minus the value of changes in survival 
rates) well-being  rates using four different, reasonable, assumptions about p 
and r for the period 1820-1965.  Table 4.5 presents numerical values for per 
capita Swedish GDP, both Usher adjusted and unadjusted, in terms of  1970 
U.S. dollars, with  1820 being the base. In effect, survival rates in  1820 are 
given zero value while the value of post-1820 changes in those survival rates 
is added (or subtracted) from actual per capita GDP. The same information for 
the period  1870-1965  is presented in table 4.6, but this time per capita GDP 
in 1870 is taken as the base where survival rates have zero value. 
All these tables tend to confirm the general pattern of Swedish HDI develop- 
ment, that is, a steady upward trend with setbacks only on a few occasions in 
the  first half  of  the nineteenth  century  and once around World War  I. The 
Usher-adjusted numbers, however, fluctuate much more drastically than does 
the HDI. The reason for this is that survival rates, especially infant and child 
mortality  rates, which weigh  very heavily in the Usher-adjusted calculation, 
fluctuated much more than the other components of the HDI. These results, 
especially for the pre- 1850 period, strongly support the conclusions concem- 
ing welfare, especially child welfare, that we presented in an earlier paper (see 
Sandberg and Steckel 1988). 
The overall result for the 1820-50 period is that it was a time of very modest, 
preindustrial, growth in both per capita GDP and in Usher-adjusted welfare. 
What is worse, there were extremely wide swings in dollar-evaluated survival 
rates. Clearly, this represents a preindustrial regime where agricultural growth 
was low and subject to wide swings in harvest outcomes, which resulted in 
even wider welfare swings. In addition, the epidemiological environment was 
highly variable. Improvements in welfare were slow and uncertain. 
We do not, however, accept the possible implication of the 1820-50  line in 
table 4.7, which shows no clear-cut gain in welfare from the Usher adjustment, 
that there was no improvement  in health whatsoever during that period. The 
apparent lack of health improvement is entirely the result of a temporary up- 
ward blip in young child, but not infant, mortality during the period around 
1850. In view of the temporary nature of this unfortunate development, as well 154  Lars G. Sandberg and Richard H. Steckel 
Table 4.4  Measured and Revised Per Capita GDP Five-Year Growth Rates 
(in percentages) 
r = 0.05  r = 0.10 















































































































































































Source: See text. 
as the fact that heights,  infant  mortality, and overall life expectancy all im- 
proved, we are sticking to our view that there was a modest general trend to- 
ward better health during the 1820-50 period. 
After 1850, the situation improved markedly. Indeed for the period 1850-70, 
the rate of growth of per capita GDP was approximately  1.1 percent per an- 
num, with the Usher-adjusted  welfare index growing at approximately twice 
that rate. Thus, increased survival rates added as much to welfare as did the, 
not inconsiderable, growth of per capita GDP. After  1870, the rate of growth 
of per capita GDP accelerated while the growth in the value of rising survival 
rates appears to, at least, have continued at the 1850-70  rate. Over the entire 
period,  1870-1950  per capita GDP grew at a rate of  about 2.1 percent per 155  Was Industrialization Hazardous to Your Health? Not in Sweden! 
Table 4.5  Measured and Revised Real Per Capita GDP (in 1970 US.  dollars), 
1820-70 
r = 0.05  r = 0.10 
Year  Measured  p = 0.25  p = 0.45  p = 0.25  p = 0.45 
1820  295  295  295  295  295 
1850  318  297  327  328  335 
1870  400  506  49 1  510  486 
Source: See text. 
Table 4.6  Measured and Revised Real Per Capita GDP (in 1970 U.S. dollars), 
1870-1965 
r = 0.05  r = 0.10 
Year  Measured  p = 0.25  p = 0.45  p = 0.25  p = 0.45 
1870  400  400  400  400  400 
1890  554  820  693  792  679 
1910  897  1,908  1,380  1,803  1,335 
1950  2,128  8,598  4,73 1  7,684  4,428 
1965  3.3 11  14,677  7,752  12,923  7,196 
Source: See text. 
Table 4.7  Measured and Revised Real Per Capita GDP Annual Growth Rates 
(in percentages), 1820-1965 
r = 0.05  r = 0.10 
Year  Measured  p = 0.25  p = 0.45  p = 0.25  p = 0.45 
1820-50  0.3  0.0  0.3  0.4  0.5 
1850-70  1.1  2.7  2.1  2.3  1.8 
1820-70  0.6  1.1  1  .o  1.1  1  .o 
1870-1950  2.1  3.9  3.1  3.8  3.1 
1950-65  3  .O  3.6  3.4  3.5  3.3 
1870-1965  2.3  3.9  3.2  3.6  3.1 
~ 
Source: See text. 
annum, while increasing survival rates added at the very least another percent- 
age point to the annual growth of Usher-adjusted welfare. 
What is perhaps most striking, however, is that after circa 1950 (and up to 
the end of our data in 1965), increasing survival rates have added very little, 
perhaps a third of a percentage point, to the annual growth of Usher-adjusted 
welfare. This is less than for any substantial number of  years since approxi- 
mately  1850. Equally  intriguing,  a  similar  result  can  be  observed  for  the 
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This clear recent slowdown in the contribution of reduced mortality to in- 
creasing well-being  is made no less interesting by  the fact that, during this 
same period, expenditures on medical care in Sweden, and the United States 
and elsewhere, have been increasing at an extraordinary and, indeed, a fright- 
ening rate.  Today,  of course,  controlling the  “monstrous”  level and rate of 
growth of medical expenditures is a major economic and political problem in 
all high-income countries. It is no doubt this relatively recent experience with 
huge and exploding medical costs that has made the criticism of double count- 
ing levied, especially by Jeffrey Williamson, at the Usher welfare adjustment 
seem so compelling. That is, the charge that the decrease in mortality rates has 
to a very substantial degree been the direct result of the deliberate expenditure 
of resources already counted in per capita GDP. 
Our data, however, seem to indicate that the really impressive contribution 
of mortality decrease to welfare, at least in Sweden, occurred during a period 
when the share of national product devoted to public health and medical care 
was still quite modest. During that period, it seems likely that the very impres- 
sive drops in mortality were largely (1) the by-product of income-induced im- 
provements in nutrition and housing, (2)  the result of disembodied advances in 
knowledge concerning sanitation and health, and (3) the result of public health 
and medical expenditures (e.g., sanitation infrastructure and vaccinations) that 
yielded  huge amounts of  consumer surplus in the form of  improved health. 
More recently, these cheap sources of reduced mortality and improved health 
have been largely exhausted. For the past 40 or 50 years, further improvements 
have come in return  for great expenditures on medical research, equipment, 
and personnel. Thus, it may  well be that in the relatively  recent past there 
should not be any Usher adjustment of welfare growth. The modest increases 
recorded in the value of survival probably have been fully paid for by expendi- 
tures recorded in GDP. 
4.5  Conclusions 
The principal conclusion of this paper is stated in the title. In Sweden rapid 
industrialization certainly accompanied, and almost certainly was responsible 
for, major improvements in health and welfare. The general state of health of 
the population was improving, albeit at a modest and uncertain rate, even dur- 
ing the pre-1850 period when average incomes were stagnating and the distri- 
bution of that income was deteriorating. After  1850, and especially after the 
onset of rapid industrialization around 1870, the improvement in health accel- 
erated. It took  the events of World War I and the Spanish flu  to create one 
(hopefully) final downward blip in Swedish health statistics. 
The fact that health conditions, and the level of human welfare, were trend- 
ing upward even while average incomes were stagnating, income distribution 
was becoming less equal, and the earnings of the mass of  the population was 
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diet, public health measures, improved child care, and epidemiological condi- 
tions) favored improved health. The very rapid, and continuing, improvements 
in health conditions following 1870 indicate that the income gains that indus- 
trialization generated more than offset any deleterious effects of industrializa- 
tion and, rather limited, urbanization. More and better food, housing, medical 
care, and (government financed) public health measures carried the day. Com- 
pared to most other nationalities, Swedes had, and continue to have, no right 
to be dour. Skoal! 
Data Appendix 
In this paper we have relied on four basic types of historical data. 
Real Per Capita Income 
All of our real per capita income (strictly, per capita GDP) figures for the 
period 1820-1965  ultimately are based on the work of Olle Krantz and Carl- 
Axel Nilsson. On the recommendation  of  Krantz, we used the figures pub- 
lished in Maddison (1991) for the period 1820-60.  This series was then con- 
nected to the series for the period 1860-1965  contained in Krantz and Nilsson 
(1980). These original numbers were reported in 1970 Swedish kronor, which 
we converted to U.S. dollars at the 1970 exchange rate of 5.18 Skr per U.S. 
dollar. 
Life Expectancy at Birth 
Our life expectancy at birth figures come from Keyfitz and Fleiger (1968). 
It is their five-year intervals that dictated our use of the same interval for calcu- 
lating the HDI. 
Literacy Rates of the Adult Population 
The literacy numbers are based on the conclusion reported by, although by 
no means unique to, Cipolla (1969) that Swedish literacy had reached 90 per- 
cent by 1850 and that virtually all Swedish youths were then literate. The com- 
pulsory education act of 1842 was unquestionably having an effect, although 
schools were certainly commonplace even before that year. Given a flow of 
virtually  100 percent  literate cohorts reaching  adulthood after  1850, a 0.25 
annual rate of  increase in literacy up to 100 percent in  1890 seems highly 
reasonable. Similarly, a 0.25 percent rate before 1850 also yields a reasonable 
result of 82.5 percent in 1820. 
Adult Male Heights 
Estimates of Swedish heights come from two different military sources. The 
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come from the heights of the conscripted militia. These nationwide average 
data cover the great majority of young men measured in the year they turned 
age 21 (born 1820-97),  age 20 (born 1898-1929), age 19 (born 1930-35),  and 
finally age 18 (born 1936-present).  Since these age reductions occurred in line 
with the decline in the age of maturation, however, these changes have very 
little effect on the trend in final adult heights.  More worrisome was the fact 
that the military imposed nontrivial height standards on cohorts born between 
1819 and  1839. We  corrected  for the resulting  shortfall using  the Quantile 
Bend Estimator (Wachter and Trussell 1982). The fact that data are missing for 
a few scattered years forced us to interpolate for those years. 
Our second source of height data, the trend results of which we discuss for 
cohorts born before  1820 but which are not included in any of our indexes, is 
based  on  a  sample of  approximately 40,000 soldiers of  various  ages  who 
served in the "settled"  (indelta)  army between roughly 1730 and 1980. In so- 
cial and economic terms, the soldiers were approximately on a par with croft- 
ers. Below them were all the various categories of landless rural residents. We 
sampled the data by selecting regiments scattered around the country (includ- 
ing the city of Stockholm) and then drew a sample of soldiers from each regi- 
ment. In view of the inevitable shortfall in these data, the average heights were 
then corrected using the Quantile Bend Estimator. See Sandberg and Steckel 
(1988) for a more extensive discussion of these data. 
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